The muted market reaction to this weeks budget deal in Washington may initially seem like a disappointment. After all, uncertainty over government spending, debt and taxes has consistently emerged in business sentiment surveys as the biggest single factor holding back corporate investment and damaging financial confidence. Why then did Wall Street celebrate this breakthrough with its biggest daily fall in two months?
The standard explanation is that the budget deal will accelerate the tapering of monetary policy by the Federal Reserve Board, and that is probably a valid expectation. The main reason for the seemingly perverse response, however, is simply that this budget deal was predictable to the point of inevitability, even if most Washington pundits committed to the standard narrative of US political dysfunction and gridlock did not see it coming until this week. Viewed from outside the Beltway, the inevitability of eventual bipartisan cooperation on the budget has been obvious since the 2012 election, which essentially settled all the important US fiscal debates.
Having argued this position all year and having suggested back in October that a deal by this week was very likely, I could hardly be surprised that the markets greeted this event with a yawn. Short-term players on Wall Street have simply followed the time-honoured formula of buy on the rumour, sell on the news. Business leaders and long-term investors, by contrast, are likely to be relieved and even enthused by this agreement, but their responses will have to be assessed over weeks, months and even years, not just a few days.
There are, however, several important lessons that can be drawn already from the US budget agreement, several with implications for politics and economic policy in other countries. Here, briefly, are five:
1. Political analysts, lobbyists and media pundits whose professional reputations or business models depend on emphasising or dramatising political battles often present a misleading picture of economic policies. They naturally tend to exaggerate confrontations and underestimate the possibilities of compromise, even in situations where the interests of all the main political players point towards cooperation, rather than conflict. This principle is as true of monetary policy as of fiscal policy and it applies around the world. For example, European political analysts often exaggerate the confrontations between Germany and other countries or the risks to the euro posed by the German constitutional court or the Bundesbank.
2. US politics since the 2012 election has provided a classic example